FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CROMWELLIAN PROTCTORATE

INTRODUCTION

This paper seeks to examine the foreign policy of the Cromwellian Protectorate by examining its relations with the United Provinces, France and Spain in the period December 1653 to December 1654 and its dealings with the Swedes and Dutch during 1655-1656. As space does not permit an attempt to chronicle the foreign affairs dealings of the entire period of the Protectorate (1653-1659) I have attempted to determine the principles of operation of Cromwell's foreign policy by particular reference to these two key periods and to how they have been seen by a number of 20th Century commentators. Although the final decisions for war with Spain (October 1655) and alliance with France (November 1656-March 1657) fall outside the periods in question, these two events only represent the culmination of policies already set in train with regard to the Netherlands, France, Spain and Sweden.

It can be argued that the zenith of Cromwells foreign policy was reached within the first twelve months of his Protectorate. In the opening speech of his first Parliament on September 4th 1654 Cromwell was able to inform its members that :

"You have now...peace with Sweden, an honourable peace...You have a peace with the Dane...You have a peace with the Dutch...And I think it was as desirable...as any one thing that lay before us... As a peace with the Protestant States hath much security in it, so it hath as much of honour and of assurance to the Protestant interest abroad...You hath a peace likewise with... Portugal...a peace that your merchants make us believe is of good concernment to their trade....Indeed peace is...desirable with all men....We are upon a treaty with France...And I dare say that there is not a nation in Europe, but they are willing to ask a good understanding with you..

By any logical consideration this situation represented the optimum position for England during the interregnum. At this point it was not actually at war with any the major European powers while its naval power gave it a pivotal role in European politics together with freedom of trade and security against invasion. The argument of this paper is that the Protectorate's involvement with foreign powers was surprisingly extensive and that its foreign policy was not as aggressive or inappropriate, by contemporary standards, as has been assumed by some commentators.

The Protectorate inherited an unhappy international position from the Rump and Barebones Parliaments. It was at war with the Dutch, in states of undeclared war with France and Portugal and at odds with the Danes (allies of the Dutch). By September 1654, however, these problems had been remedied and Cromwell's claims to being a peacemaker had some considerable justification as he had treaties or negotiations in hand with all these powers.

During the course of the Protectorate, the only conscious decision for war was taken with regard to Spain, a decision which was to have severe consequences in the areas of finance and commerce. The unfortunate "Western Design" which represented the worst military disaster of Cromwell's career was launched in December 1654 and led inevitably to war with Spain in Europe in October 1655. This war continued, in eventual alliance with France after November 1656, until the death of the Protector in September 1658. The main effects of the war were a weakening of Spain's economic and military position with respect to France and the creation of a large government debt and political problems in England. The one concrete result of the war, in terms of overall English strategy, was the capture of Dunkirk shortly before Cromwell's death. Even this belated acquisition did not long survive the death of the Protector and it was sold back to France in 1662 by Charles II

When examining these issues the question which must be asked is whether they were driven by religious, economic or political considerations. The argument of this paper is that while Cromwell was always looking at the larger picture from a "Protestant" viewpoint, in the final analysis his actions and policies were driven by either economic or political factors (or by combinations of both).

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

Historical opinion is generally adverse to Cromwell's foreign policy, Gardiner, while generally sympathetic to Cromwell considers that :

"....It is in his Baltic policy that the defects of his method were most clearly revealed"

He adds that despite noble intentions, Cromwell was misguided in his approach :

"God had brought them where they were, in order that they might consider the work they had to do in the world as well as at home." It was a noble and inspiring thought, needing even for its partial realisation...the fullest and most accurate knowledge of the Governments and peoples of other nations, a knowledge...in which Oliver was himself singularly deficient.

Gardiner's contemporary and successor C.H.Firth shares this opinion :

While the arms of the Protector were successful in Flanders, his diplomacy was a failure alike in Sweden and Germany. For a moment success crowned the efforts of his ambassadors, but the policy which dictated those efforts was too little in accordance with the actual conditions of the time to achieve substantial results.

 

Cromwell's desire to keep the peace between England and Holland was the corner stone of his diplomacy.

..the commercial interests of his country and purely political considerations were never absent from his mind. Though his ultimate object might be the advancement of Protestantism, the practical steps he took to attain it for the most part directly advantaged England.

W.C. Abbott puts the view that Cromwell's foreign policy was basically an anachronism: He was harking back to the days of Elizabeth, not looking forward to the days of Anne. The Protector was engaged in the politics of the past - in the Spanish Armada, the Gunpowder Plot, and the Thirty Years' War Menna Prestwich is critical of Cromwell's foreign policy which she sees as characterised by being overly aggressive and failing to act in the best interests of England. Her main complaint is over the damage inflicted on England's commercial interests by the war with Spain, but she takes a somewhat contradictory position in the Baltic issue and complains that to Cromwell:

an alliance with Sweden to deprive the Dutch of their trade in the Baltic did not appeal to Cromwell's Protestant sensibilities

Like others before and since Prestwich argues that the war with Spain was based on an anachronistic view of the world and a misguided belief that a Protestant league against Catholicism was a viable possibility At this time she feels that Cromwell should have seen the Dutch as the natural enemy and used the Swedish alliance to undermine the Dutch commercial position. She chooses to ignore the problem that if such a policy had been adopted there was a very real prospect of a conflict with the Dutch which England could manifestly not afford and which Cromwell prudently avoided. Prestwich's viewpoint is remarkably similar to that of Slingsby Bethel whose critique was written in 1668 and who is unswervingly critical of Cromwellian domestic and foreign policy as acting against the "interest" of England. He considers that the war with Spain "broke the balance betwixt the two Crowns [France and Spain]' and (like Gardiner) that Cromwell was ignorant of "Foreign affairs" . Like Prestwich and Abbott, Bethel considers the real winners from Cromwell's foreign policy to have been the French and Dutch. The French had an ally in helping to weaken and defeat Spain while they were also able to put down Protestant dissidents within France itself. The Dutch were able to fill the trade gap which resulted from the Spanish embargo on trade with England while Cromwell's Baltic policy preserved their interests in that sphere. It is difficult to argue with the claims of damage to commerce and trade made by Prestwich and others as no statistical evidence exists . Ashley points to a possible exaggeration of its effects and notes that the majority of pamphlets condemning these effects are dated in 1659 . It is perhaps significant that Bordeaux was able to advise Mazarin on September 16th, 1658, that it can be :

proved by the customs registers that since the rupture as much merchandise has come in and gone out as before the war.

Figures which are available indicate that during the same period customs revenues actually rose rather than fell. The full impact of the war was felt by the Government in terms of its public debt and Richard Cromwell was to inherit a total debt of some 2 million pounds on his father's death. Although this represented a proportionally smaller debt than that of France or the United Provinces, Cromwell was unable to fund it by loans as the London merchants consistently refused his requests. Throughout the period of the Protectorate it can therefore be argued that its foreign policy was at once the cause and the victim of a chronic lack of government funds. There are, however, other views on the issue of foreign policy. Hugh Trevor Roper considers that Cromwell's policy was a failure but his view is diametrically opposite to that of Prestwich when he talks of Cromwell's :

cultivation of the robber-empire in the Baltic to which he would have sacrificed English interests

The facts of the matter are however, that Cromwell never did "sacrifice English interests" in his desire for good relations with Sweden, however much wishful thinking there was in his identification of Charles X with Gustavus Adolphus and a Protestant crusade against the Habsburg empire. Coyet and Bonde spent nearly two years in search of a military alliance which would have inevitably of more assistance to Sweden than vice-versa) but had in the end to be content with a commercial agreement. In contrast to these critical viewpoints Michael Roberts contends that:

Cromwell's policy in the Baltic - after the attack on Hispaniola was sound in its objectives, appropriate in its choice of means, and (by and large) correctly calculated;

Roberts considers that whatever hindsight may tell us of the wisdom of the decision to attack Spain, once that decision was made, in political and economic terms Cromwell's subsequent Baltic policy made sense. He makes no attempt to downplay the influence of religion on the political thinking of Cromwell and his contemporaries, seeing religious enthusiasm in politics as widespread during the period to the extent that even the Swedish envoy Bonde was prepared to concede that :

when one considers the intention of the treaties that were to be entered into with Denmark, Holland and England, it was to the end that our religion be preserved against the Catholic league.

There appears to have been a general fear (unjustified in view of the attitudes and problems of the major Catholic protagonists)among the Protestant states of Europe that a Catholic conspiracy, directed by the Pope and the Austrians, existed during the 1650's. This belief appears to have been common to Cromwell, De Witt (5) and Charles X. The role of religion at this time may be seen as having a parallel in 20th Century fears of communist (or capitalist) conspiracies.

FOREIGN POLICY

The space available in this paper does not permit a detailed chronology of Protectorate foreign policy for the period being examined so this section seeks to examine and analyse it in general terms. It cannot be denied that the protectorate was a period of intense foreign affairs activity. It has been estimated that by September 1655 some 32 foreign envoys were present in London while the activities of Blake in the Mediterranean had earned England both fear and respect throughout Europe. At this stage the Protectorate had established formal relations and/or contacts with all the major powers of Europe, from Russia in the east to Portugal in the west . The documents contained in Abbott also reveal the extent of the Protectorate's dealings with what might be described as the minor states of Europe such as Brandenburg, Courland, Bremen, Hamburg, Genoa, Venice, Genoa and Savoy. It is reported that even the Pope was alarmed at Blake's depredations and that the defences of the city were put in order . Having pointed to the extent of this activity, one must than move to what are perceived its ends and purposes. The initial aim of the Protectorate was to secure a peace with the United Provinces. Cromwell appears to have been the driving force behind this policy :

...to Stockar, the Swiss envoy who had been instructed to offer the good offices of the Swiss to help end hostilities, Cromwell declared with tears in his eyes that nothing troubled him so much as the Dutch War"

Following the establishment of the Protectorate negotiations began in earnest. Cromwell was now prepared to accept the exclusion of the House of Orange by a secret article in the treaty. The main problems remained the place of Denmark in the treaty and the "exclusion" of the House of Orange. Eventually Cromwell accepted the inclusion of Denmark in the treaty while the exclusion of Orange was concealed from the States General on the condition that it be later ratified by the Estates of Holland. This device removed the impasse and, after further negotiation, the States General recognised the office of Protector and accepted his terms . By February 1654 the final arrangements had been made and after some further negotiation the final treaty was signed on April 5th. After further manoeuvers by de Witt, the States of Holland ratified the exclusion clause on April 24th, while, for his part, Cromwell proclaimed the treaty in England on the 26th. The Dutch peace has been criticised by some, both at the time and later, as being too generous and not in England's best interests but Cromwell appears to have accurately judged the mood of the people and to have achieved an agreement which both strengthened his position at home and increased England's prestige abroad . The peace re-opened the Baltic to English shipping and trade and pleased the London merchants many of whom had Dutch interests. Apart from economic considerations, Cromwell's main aim appears to have been to secure the exclusion of the House of Orange while ensuring the Stuarts were denied a refuge so close to home. Having thus achieved it primary foreign policy objective by concluding the Dutch war, the next task for the Protectorate was to define its relationship with France and Spain. Both of these nations were Catholic, in one sense or another were England's traditional enemies, and, most significantly, were presently at war. This last factor gave the military power of England, projected through its fleet, an importance to Europe that it might otherwise not have had During the early 1650's France had itself suffered a series of revolts and rebellions and representatives of the various rebel groups had sought English assistance . Despite promises of aid, little, other than active encouragement by agents such as Sexby and Arundel , had been provided and by 1654 only the Huguenots survived as a recognisable element within France with elements (e.g. the Prince of the Conde) fighting with the Spanish. In this situation, support for the rebels would necessarily involve an alliance with Spain, which interestingly enough had been the first nation to recognise the Commonwealth. The threat posed to France by an English alliance with Spain in support of the

French rebels was of such concern to Mazarin (Louis XIV's chief minister) that he was prepared to set aside French repugnance at dealing with a "regicide" regime, to discard the Stuarts and :

...almost anything was preferable to war with England. When in the summer of 1654, war had seemed so near, the Cardinal wrote to Monsieur de Bordeaux that France would bear almost anything from England rather than go to war...In other words Mazarin feared a reawakening of the Fronde.

During 1654 there were thus three groups actively seeking English support. As far as the French and Spanish were concerned what resulted was a progressive and unrealistic escalation of the offers they were prepared to make. The French were prepared to offer support for the English in taking Dunkirk while the Spaniards offered the same at Calais . Two sets of commissioners were appointed to handle the bargaining while the two ambassadors sought authority from their governments to make bigger and better offers of financial support. In the event the Spanish bid of £300,000 was made on May 8th with 2/3 to be paid in advance. At this stage Cromwell appears to have been uncertain as to what policy to pursue as he once again approached the French who suggested a West Indian adventure. When this was rejected by Pickering , Baas terminated the interview. Another interview on the 18th was also stormy as the French refused to outbid the Spaniards. Following this clash with the French, Cromwell advised Cardenas that he would accept the offer of £300,000 pounds and was ready to declare war on France although the Scottish campaign meant that he would have to defer action until the following year . Cardenas was forced to refer to Brussels for instructions but urged Cromwell to declare war at once. Cromwell also indicated that he was prepared to support the Conde. This turn of events seems peculiar in the light of reports of a meeting of the Council of State on April 20th at which an attack on the Spanish West Indies was proposed as the most useful employment for the English fleet . Gardiner intimates that the rejection of Baas' suggestion was a device to coax the French into outbidding the Spaniards. At the same time it appears that English public opinion was inclining towards an attack on Spain as a letter from Barriere indicates :

Les Espagnols doivent bien considerer cette affaire, car il est fort a craindre que s'ils ne traitent avec M. le Protecteur, il traitera avec la France, a quoy tout le conseil est fort incline, et fort porte contre l'Espagne, comme l'ambassadeur scait fort bien, toute l'Angleterre desirant avec passion que l'on attacque les Indies.

Gardiner sees Cromwell as hoping to protect the interests of the French Protestants as part of the conditions of an alliance with France but, when this was rejected, being prepared to ally himself with Spain. During May Cromwell still sought an accord with France, despite his promises to Cardenas, and the Council of State also appears to have been shifting its overall position. A combination of public opinion and Spanish financial weakness appears to have gradually tipped the balance in favour of a "Western Design". In late May a plot against Cromwell was uncovered and its perpetrators executed. A connection between Baas and the conspiracy was established and on June 12th he appeared before the Council of State. Baas was unrepentant and was ordered to leave the country within three days. It is significant that these revelations did not throw England into the arms of Spain. The main reason appears to have been that the Spanish were having grave difficulty in raising the agreed funds That the French were keen to come to an agreement with Cromwell is apparent from a letter to Bordeaux from Louis XIV on 17th June. This letter commented on English dealings with the Spanish and on Cromwell's determination to obtain concessions which would advance his position both at home and abroad. Bordeaux was told to convince the Protector of the advantages to himself and to England of an agreement with France. Apart from the financial considerations a further requirement was that Charles II and the Duke of York be expelled from French territory. On 19th June Cromwell wrote to Louis XIV offering to continue negotiations, despite the activities of Baas, and seeking a French port (Brest) to be held as security ; an idea rejected by Bordeaux. Despite the apparent continuation of the "auction" between France and Spain, Cromwell appears to have moved steadily towards an agreement. France. Early in July he rejected proposals to assist the Conde but was still concerned about the position of the Huguenots [Bordeaux refused to commit France to any improvement in their position]. Cromwell also rejected ideas of involvement against Spain in Europe and was working towards a "commercial and maritime understanding with France which would open French ports to English trade. For their part the Spaniards refused English demands for :

..liberty of conscience for Englishmen in the Spanish dominions, and freedom of trade in the West Indies.

Cromwell now appears to have determined on a war with Spain. On July 20th 1654 there was a debate in the Council of State over the launch of the "Western Design" and the question of its viability. It is the evidence of this meeting that illustrates much of the rationale of the war against Spain and the general principles that motivated the foreign policy of the Protectorate:

Wee consider this attempt, because wee thinke God has not brought us hither where wee are but to consider the worke that wee may doe in the world as well as at home...haveinge 160 ships swimminge most of Europe our enemyes except Holland, and that would be well considered also: we thinke our best consideration had to keep up this reputation and improve it to some good, and not lay them up by the walls....It was told us that this designe would cost little more then laying by the shipps, and that with hope of greate profitt. The probabilitye of the good of the designe, both for the Protestants' cause and utilitye to the undertakers, and the cost noe more for one twelve month then would disband the shipps.

It is interesting that Lambert disagreed with Cromwell's assessment that the costs of the campaign could be recouped and felt that the Spaniards would be no pushover.

The Thurloe papers set out seven reasons for the final decision of the Protector and Council's decision in favour of a treaty with France, the culmination (October 1655) of the process begun in July 1654.

(1) It would frustrate the French royal interest in restoring the House of Stuart.

(2) France had a Protestant minority

(3) France had ancient ties with Scotland

(4) A French alliance would keep the Dutch in check

(5) It might also prevent Spain from retaking Portugal

(6) It would halt the losses of English merchant vessels to French privateers in the Mediterranean

(7) It would advance Cromwell's dreams of leading a united protestant world against Papist Spain and the House of Austria

The disadvantage of this policy was that there would be severe losses in English trade with Spain but by 18th August the decision was virtually made and Cromwell authorised the expedition to the Caribbean. The Council had control of the operational facets of the expedition and Thurloe rather than Cromwell signed the instructions for Penn and Venables, the leaders of the expedition.

Despite continued negotiations with the French and Spanish over the latter half of 1654, and letters of friendship to Philip of Spain (1) the preparations continued and the fleet (though ill-equipped for its purpose) was dispatched in late December. As with most aspects of Protectorate foreign policy, things developed slowly and the force did not come into action (and defeat) until May 1655. Relations with Spain deteriorated steadily during 1655 with the Protector declaring war in October (2). Negotiations with the French progressed with frustrating (for the French) slowness, their most significant delay being due to the Vaudois massacres of April 1655 which implicated the French. This event caused Cromwell to exert considerable diplomatic pressure on the French who obtained concessions for the Protestants by October of the same year at which time a treaty of friendship (rather than of alliance) was signed by England and France (3). In summarising the relationship between the Protectorate and France and Spain, it can be seen that the decisions taken in July 1654 culminated in October 1655 with the declaration of war with Spain (4) and the simultaneous treaty agreement with France. In the long term it is probable that Mazarin gained more from the agreement than did Cromwell as the weakening of the Spanish by the extension of the war led to the treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659. Peace with Spain had all along been the main goal of the Cardinal, his view was that if Cromwell was his ally he would not assist either the Spanish or the French rebels (5). One of the most interesting, and revealing episodes of the Protectorate's foreign policy was the prolonged negotiations with Sweden.

The treaty of Uppsala which had been concluded by Bulstrode Whitelocke on 11th April 1654 left some points unsettled and required a Swedish mission to England for their resolution. As a result, first Peter Coyet (1618-67) and subsequently Christer Bonde (1621-1659) were appointed as representatives of Charles X at Cromwell's court. Coyet expressed Cromwell's attitude to the Swedish connection in his regular reports to Charles: ...that he would seek to Y.M.'s [Charles X] laudable designs..in the sure belief that Y.M. on his side, as he on his, would always seek to uphold the honour of God's name and the liberty of the evangelical religion, which ..reposed mainly on two columns, that is, on England and Sweden. Coyet concluded that England appeared willing to enter into a stricter alliance with Sweden and advised his master to play the protestant link to the full as :

The fact that "papa romanus" is now making every effort to unite all catholic potentates causes them [the English] to fear that on his incitement they may undertake measures most oppressive to the protestants.

On July 13th Cromwell reaffirmed his support for Sweden and vowed to use his influence to restrain the Dutch from intervening in the Baltic. The diplomatic problems which the hostility of the Protestant powers felt towards each other caused for Cromwell is obvious at this stage. Coyet in the same letter referred to his own anti-Dutch activities:

All of which was designed to exhibit them in an odious light, and to make the English disinclined for their [Dutch] alliance.

Up to a point it would appear that Cromwell saw a Swedish alliance in religious terms. Roberts considers that provided it "served to draw closer the bonds of protestant unity" it was worthwhile, but if the opposite proved to be true it should be rejected. The major problem for England in engaging in such an alliance with Sweden was that it might involve conflict with the Dutch and the Danes over trade access issues in the Baltic. The results of this would be to create the same problems as had existed during the Dutch war. For a considerable period, however, this outcome was in the balance. According to Gardiner when Bonde arrived in July 1655 :

.he was received with exuberant delight.. Oliver repeated ..his veneration for the great Gustavus and his admiration for his successor. The Dutch were, however, a "complication" and he must take some time to consider the proposal of an alliance between England and Sweden....It was ..much to be desired that the design which the Most High God had only begun to accomplish in Germany through Gustavus of glorious memory might be completed by the great King Charles. To such a consummation he would gladly lend a hand.

Throughout the negotiations the Swedes were aware of Cromwell's desire for a Protestant alliance

and of the importance he gave to religious considerations. Bonde advised his master that:

since I know that talk of religion was very acceptable to him and, I hope, in no way prejudicial to Y.M., ..I said that personally I considered that Christendom (of the true evangelical religion) had no greater support to rely upon at this time, than Y.M. and England.

 

If they had hoped for rapid progress the Swedes were to be disappointed, for while there was little delay in negotiations on the outstanding issues from Whitelocke's treaty, despite the apparent enthusiasm of the Protector, the question of an alliance was not addressed seriously until early 1656. At this stage the negotiation process appears to have been a mixture of secret discussions between Cromwell and Bonde with the Protector then seeking the advice of members of the Council of State. Cromwell appears to have been an inexpert negotiator and to have regularly contradicted himself, particularly when he indicated readiness to accept a defensive alliance against any assailant, a move which would have reversed the whole "aggressive" thrust of an anti-catholic policy while definitely leading to conflict with the Dutch. This implication was disavowed and on 21st April 1656 Bonde was informed that while a limited defensive alliance might be acceptable, any provision suggesting it was against any other power was not as this might include the Dutch. In general, Roberts believes that Charles X had little of real value to offer England in 1656 and that he only paid lip-service to the "Protestant Cause" (1) The argument can be further developed as England had in fact no external enemies before the war with Spain and hence there was no value to England in any treaty of mutual assistance. For the Dutch and English, preservation of republican regimes against the threats of Stuart and Orange was of paramount importance. This meant that despite the domestic pressures exerted by English actions against Dutch shipping on the high seas and the resentment of English merchants at what they saw as Dutch circumvention of embargoes against Spain, both Cromwell and De Witt were reluctant to let the situation degenerate into open warfare. The Swedish alliance foundered on the divergence of interests of the two nations and their leaders. The English wanted a protestant alliance which included the Dutch and which would lead to peace in the Baltic with the Swedes committed to an attack on the Emperor. The Swedes wanted English support against any opponent, particularly the Dutch, and were only committed to the Protestant alliance in so far as it might gain them English support. Cromwell's vision of Charles as a protestant hero was not sufficient to commit him to an alliance which he saw was against England's best interests.

FOREIGN POLICY RESPONSIBILITY

Articles II, IV and V of the Instrument of Government laid down that the Lord Protector was to exercise authority "..with the advice and consent of the major part of the Council" . These articles while placing ultimate power (and responsibility) in the hands of the Protector, can be taken to imply a form of collective decision making which involved the Council of State. We know that the concept of the "Western Design" was accepted at the meeting of 20th April 1654 and that there were at least three groupings within the Council with different views on relations with France and Spain. It appears likely that for much of the first few months of 1654 that a majority of the Council were in favour of war with France rather than Spain. Roberts considers that it was indeed likely that the Council had a considerable say in the direction of foreign policy and cites Cromwell as having told Nieupoort (the Dutch envoy) "that he himself without the council did not use to dispose of such affairs" Cardenas in his October 1655 . Letter, refers to foreign policy decisions as being taken at the Council of State and that the decision to imprison Penn and Venables in the Tower was taken by the Council, rather than by Cromwell acting on his own. It is also evident that in his 1656 negotiations Bordeaux had considerable dealings with the Secretary of State (Thurloe) and with other ministers, rather than solely with the Protector. Examination of the role of the Council indicates that while Cromwell was able to dominate his Council on critical issues (as with the October 1655 declaration of war with Spain) the perception of those with whom he dealt was that while he was the key figure, his was not the only voice in policy making. Michael Roberts concludes that Protectorate foreign policy was undertaken by amateurs:

" ..the strongest impression that remains about foreign policy in the period of the Protectorate is that it was conducted by amateurs. Highly intelligent amateurs, some of them; but amateurs ..It was no wonder if they made mistakes: the wonder was rather that they made so few.

SUMMARY

In summary it must be concluded that while Cromwell did direct a "Protestant" foreign policy, this did not blind him to England's "interests". As he himself said in April 1657 :

..If any whosoever think the interest of Christians and the interest of the nation inconsistent, I wish my soul may never enter into their secrets...And upon these two interests...I shall live and die.

From a reading of actual events there appears little reason to argue with him on this score as, whether in his dealings with France and Spain or with the Dutch and Swedes, the preservation of English interests in terms of politics or trade was paramount, particularly in so far as they impinged on the security of the Protectorate itself. Crabtree and Roberts both contend that, in the contemporary context, Cromwell's foreign policy was both logical, consistent and, in political

terms, effective. However critical one may be of the outcome of the Spanish war, one cannot help but feel that much of the criticism of the Protectorate's foreign policy is based on hindsight rather than an appreciation of contemporary attitudes and pressures. This paper concludes in agreement with Crabtree that:

..in his diplomacy in the Baltic, in the Dutch treaty, in the Spanish war and the French alliance, Cromwell's motives were neither anachronistic nor fanatical. The success of his policies is another question..